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One Step at a Time:
Does Gradualism Build Coordination?

Abstract
This study investigates a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With theoretical guidance using a
belief-based learning model, we conduct a multi-period, binary-choice, and weakest-link laboratory
coordination experiment to study the effect of gradualism – increasing the required levels (stakes) of
contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – on group
coordination performance. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a
high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake
while gradually increasing the stakes over time (the Gradualism treatment). We find that relative to the
other two treatments, groups coordinate most successfully at high stakes in the Gradualism treatment. We
also find evidence that supports the belief-based learning model. These findings point to a simple
mechanism for promoting successful voluntary coordination.
JEL Classifications: C91; C92; D03; D71; D81; H41
Keywords: gradualism, coordination, laboratory experiment, belief-based learning

1.

Introduction

Coordination is at the core of a wide variety of economic activities and organizational performance
(Schelling, 1960; Arrow, 1974). 1 However, efficient coordination outcomes are often difficult to attain
without effective coordination mechanisms (Van Huyck, Battalio & Beil, 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994;
Cachon & Camerer, 1996; Weber, 2006; Devetag & Ortmann, 2007). Managers routinely face the challenge
of how best to induce a high level of effort and facilitate coordination across multiple agents both within
and across organizations, which has been a central issue in the practice and science of organizational
management (Van De Ven, Delbecq & Koenig, 1976; Lounamaa & March, 1987; Smith, Carroll & Ashford,
1995; Siemsen, Balasubramanian & Roth, 2001; Rico et al., 2008; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Leading
business magazines such as the Harvard Business Review routinely run articles on how to promote
teamwork and coordination (e.g., Hackman, 2009; Prusak, 2011).
In this paper we propose and test one mechanism to promote coordination, which we call gradualism:
starting small and gradually increasing the stake of a coordination project within a fixed group. The
corresponding hypothesis is that allowing agents to coordinate first on small and easy-to-achieve goals
(projects) and slowly increasing the level of goals, facilitates subsequent coordination on otherwise hardto-achieve outcomes.
Gradualism is employed by managers and leaders in a wide range of real-world settings. Team building
often adopts a gradual method: to help build coordination in collaborative projects involving pivotal efforts
from all members, new employees and teams are initially given smaller or easier tasks which ensure that
they can then coordinate well in larger or harder tasks later. For example, law enforcement units, police
Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams, as well as special military groups, are initially given ordinary
low-stake tasks until proven effective before they are assigned to resolve more critical high-stake situations.
In entrepreneurship, the success of a startup venture requires the effort and input from all partners with
various expertise and resources, and the growth path involves starting very small (e.g., little capital), and
then progressing through funding rounds where larger and larger investments are made (Zhou & Su, 2011).
Microfinance institutions often offer group loans that start small and increase in size upon successful
repayment by all members of the group (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010). Last, leaders of international
organizations also adopt the gradualist approach to facilitate international coordination. Abbott and Snidal
(2002) highlights the function of the gradualist approach in the development of the 1997 OECD Anti
Bribery Convention. Combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions
requires inputs from all countries involved; otherwise, the corrupted business can easily circumvent the
campaign and exercise in the countries with least effort on anti-corruption. Thus, the international anti-
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bribery collaboration reflects a multi-player coordination problem, which involves the strategic uncertainty
about the effort level other partner countries are willing to exert. Breaking the final goal into a series of
steps has allowed the countries to avoid the failure in previous big-bang approaches which sought an
immediate international treaty requiring others states to adopt the equivalent anti-bribery regulation as in
the US. International agreements on law enforcement, trade, arms reduction, and environmental
coordination have also adopted a similar gradualist approach (Benyon, 1994; Langlois & Langlois, 2001).
We conduct a computer-based laboratory coordination experiment with repeated interactions. In each
period, every subject is endowed with a certain amount of points (monetary units in the laboratory) and is
asked to participate in a group project with a certain stake level. Each subject has two options: (1) to
contribute the exact pre-set amount (i.e., the stake) or (2) to contribute nothing. In each period, each subject
realizes an extra return only when all group members contribute to the project; otherwise, each member
ends up with the initial endowment minus his/her contribution. This set-up is generally referred to as the
minimum-effort or weakest-link coordination game: the payoff depends on the effort of the individual and
the minimum effort of all group members. The stage game in each period is a multi-player stag hunt because
of the binary choice feature available to each player.2
We assign the subjects to three main treatments of differing stake patterns. In particular, the stake
patterns differ in the first six periods but feature an identical high stake for the next six periods. The first
treatment, which we call Big Bang, features a constant high stake for all 12 periods. The second treatment,
called Semi-Gradualism, features a constant low stake for the first six periods and then a high stake for the
next six periods. In our third and key treatment, termed Gradualism, we increase the stake in each of the
first six periods in small amounts until the highest stake is reached in Period 7. We exploit this design to
address how the pattern of varying stake levels influences group coordination at high-stake levels.
Specifically, we test the effect of gradualism on coordination performance in the high-stake periods. See
Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of all treatments.
[Figure 1 about here]
We propose a belief-based learning model which predicts that gradualism attains more successful
coordination at a high-stake level than alternative treatments, which is confirmed by our experimental
results. In terms of magnitude, the effects are large: 61.1% of the Gradualism groups successfully
coordinate in the final period, whereas only 16.7% and 33.3% of Big Bang and Semi-Gradualism groups
do so, respectively. The Semi-Gradualism treatment fails to foster high-stake coordination compared with
the Gradualism treatment. Our findings suggest that for a group to establish successful coordination at a
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high-stake level, it is better to begin at a low-stake level and, equally important, to increase the stake level
slowly.
When a person interacts with others in a group, he/she not only learns about group members but may
also develop beliefs about the contributing tendencies of an average person from the general population.
Thus, we introduce a second stage to the experiment. The subjects from various treatments in the first stage
were randomly reshuffled into new groups when they entered the second stage of the game, and then
continued to play at the same stake level as the end of the first stage. We hypothesize that subjects who
were in the gradualism treatment may contribute more when they enter the new groups because they have
higher beliefs about others’ contribution possibilities. Subjects may also adapt their behavior over time as
their beliefs update in the second stage.
We find that subjects in the Gradualism treatment, who are more likely to experience successful
coordination at the end of the first stage than subjects in the other treatments, are 12.2 percentage points
more likely to contribute upon entering a new group when we reshuffle subjects from all treatments into
new groups in the second stage. However, subjects who were initially in the Gradualism treatment become
less likely to contribute when they find that their contributions are not rewarded in the new environment,
possibly because the new group members may have had different coordination outcomes previously. This
result provides suggestive evidence of the role of beliefs which players carry from old groups to new ones
and later update based on the performance of the new groups.
To further explore the potential channel through which gradualism fosters high-stake coordination, we
conduct a supplementary experiment akin to the main experiment except that we explicitly elicit the beliefs
of the subjects regarding the probability that other group members contribute in each period. The results
are consistent with the belief-based learning model: subjects form their initial beliefs based on the initial
stake, make their contribution decisions based on their beliefs, and update their beliefs after observing the
coordination outcome in each period.
The present study is the first that clearly tests the role of exogenous gradualism in coordination within
a fixed group. The present study adopts an exogenous setting of stake paths and explores whether
gradualism works better rather than whether players choose gradualism. By randomizing subjects into
various treatments, we avoid the problem of self-selection when gradualism is endogenously chosen. We
find that the coordination success rate is indeed higher under the gradualism mechanism, which may help
explain why gradualism is a popular practice in many real world settings.
The present study has two key contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the
literature on coordination mechanisms. Economists have addressed ways to promote successful
coordination via various mechanisms, such as communication (Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Weber
et al., 2001; Duffy & Feltovich, 2002, 2006), teams (Feri, Irlenbusch & Sutter, 2010), between-group
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competitions (Bornstein, Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; Riechmann & Weimann, 2008), voluntary group
formation (Yang et al., 2017), voluntary reward (Yang et al., 2018), gradual organization growth (Weber,
2006), social identities (Chen & Chen, 2011; Chen, Li, Liu & Shih, 2014), information feedback
(Berninghaus & Ehrhart, 2001; Devetag, 2003; Brandts & Cooper, 2006a), and transfer of learning across
games (Devetag, 2005; Cason, Savikhin & Sheremeta, 2012). The present study examines how exogenous
stake paths foster successful group coordination, thus proposing gradualism as an alternative mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other studies that examine the effect of exogenous path dependence
on group coordination are Weber (2006) and Romero (2015).3 Second, our study contributes to the more
general literature on dynamic simultaneous games with a gradualist feature, such as in the settings of public
goods (Dorsey, 1992; Marx & Matthews, 2000; Kurzban et al., 2001; Duffy, Ochs & Vesterlund, 2007;
Offerman & van der Veen, 2013; Oprea, Charness & Friedman, 2014) and prisoners’ dilemmas (Andreoni
& Samuelson, 2006). We provide detailed comparisons between the present study and the literature on
dynamic simultaneous games in Section 2.

2.

Relation with the Literature on Dynamic Simultaneous Games

To better understand our study and its contributions, we compare it to the theoretical and experimental
literature on coordination games with varying paths and other dynamic simultaneous games (e.g., public
goods games, prisoners’ dilemma games) with a gradualist feature.
In a dynamic laboratory weakest-link coordination experiment, Weber (2006) studies the dynamics of
organizational growth and finds that gradually expanding group size leads to more successful coordination
compared to immediately starting with a large group. The present study differs from Weber (2006) in four
major ways: (1) Weber studies the path of group size, whereas we vary the stake path and explore
gradualism in coordination within a fixed group; (2) in our study each player’s choice set in each period is
binary; (3) a third treatment – Semi-Gradualism – is used, which explores whether a sudden stake increase
negatively affects coordination; (4) our theoretical model is based on a belief-based learning framework,
whereas Weber (2006) adopts a linear adaptive dynamics framework.
In another study, Romero (2015) finds that groups coordinate better when the cost is increasing to a
specific level than when the cost is decreasing to that level. Our setting differs from his study in two ways:
(1) we change the stake level, which indicates not only the cost but also the benefit, whereas the stake level
is fixed in his study;4 (2) we compare a slow increase with a sudden increase in stake as well as a high-stake
3

Riedl, Rohde and Strobel (2011), Salmon and Weber (2011), and Yang et al. (2013) use what can be considered a
general path dependence approach, but with endogenous paths. They all focus on the issue of group size. The
exogenous stake path change in our design is novel.
4
Other studies change either benefit (Brandts & Cooper, 2006b) or cost (Goeree & Holt, 2005), but not both. Our
setup reflects those studies (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994; Cachon & Camerer, 1996; Weber, 2006)
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starting point, whereas in his study the speed of cost change is fixed. In addition, the theoretical models are
different: we employ a belief-based learning model with incomplete information, whereas Romero (2015)
assumes a quantal response equilibrium framework with bounded rationality.
Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck (2001), in a laboratory setting, also explore stake size effects in
coordination games. They focus on how various levels of an optimization premium (defined as the
difference between the payoff of the best response and inferior response to an opponent’s strategy) influence
players’ behavior differently, where the stake size is the optimization premium. In their study, the stake
size is fixed within a treatment. By contrast, we allow the stake size, interpreted as the participation cost
(as well as the net profit of success) of a stag-hunt coordination project, to vary over time within a treatment.
In particular, we examine the role of gradually increasing the stakes in building large-stake coordination,
which is not examined by Battalio, Samuelson, and Van Huyck (2001).
Within the literature on dynamic real time public goods provision, the gradualist approach in the present
study differs from those of previous studies, in particular, Dorsey (1992), Marx and Matthews (2000),
Kurzban et al. (2001), Duffy et al. (2007), and Oprea et al. (2014). In addition to our binary weakest-link
structure, which markedly differs from these studies, another unique feature of our setup is that the public
projects in our game are independent from one period to the next: contributions cannot accumulate over
periods, and each project features its own target (stake). In the aforementioned studies on dynamic voluntary
contribution to a single public project, players are allowed to contribute whenever and as much as they wish
and to accumulate their contributions over the course of the project (before the end of the game, each period
has no objective). Our study determines whether first working on smaller tasks facilitates the
accomplishment of a large task in a given group, rather than whether dividing the call for contribution into
multiple periods and allowing contributions to accumulate over time improves collective contributions.
Although the aforementioned studies do relate to certain real-world examples (e.g., long-term fund drives),
the present study is better aligned with the different, yet just as significant, real-world cases mentioned
earlier. In those introductory real-world examples, the duration of the final high-stake project is relatively
short and is not divisible into sub-periods to accumulate effort. Moreover, regular feedback about what
other participants contribute to the final project is not provided. Instead, players face an independent project
with a clear and smaller objective in each period other than the final high objective, and players assess how
they performed on these small tasks after each period.
Offerman and van der Veen (2013) explore whether governmental subsidies geared toward promoting
public good provisions should be abruptly introduced or gradually increased; in other words, given the

that fix the benefit-cost ratio 2:1 at equilibrium, but we simplify the decision choice to be binary and change the scale
of the group project simultaneously through varying the stake. Yang et al. (2017) have a similar setup where the
benefit-cost ratio is a constant 2:1 at equilibrium, but the scale increases with group size.
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benefit of the public good, whether the individual cost of providing the public good should be decreased
sharply or gradually. The results favor an immediate increase of subsidy: when the final subsidy level is
substantial, the effect of a quick increase is stronger than that of a gradual increase. The present study differs
from Offerman and van der Veen (2013) in three key ways. First, these authors focus on how the use of
subsidies can stimulate cooperation after its initial failure. The mechanism used in the present study is
distinct from their subsidy mechanism as it focuses on the variation of stake patterns instead of
governmental subsidies. Second, our study manipulates the stake level that decides both the cost and the
benefit of the public good, whereas in the setup of Offerman and van der Veen, only the cost changes. Third,
the stake paths of the present study are non-decreasing, whereas paths of the other are non-increasing.
We outline the efficiency gains of gradualism more clearly than Andreoni and Samuelson (2006).
Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) examine a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma, in which the total stakes in
two periods are fixed and the distribution of these stakes across periods can be varied. Both their theoretical
and experimental results show that the best way is to “start small” with bigger stakes in the second period.
However, cooperation is low for the period with a high stake in their experiment. One potential explanation
of the advantage of our setup in promoting efficiency over that of Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) is that
unlike their setup, our weakest-link structure does not allow free riding.
Several theoretical studies examine monotone games – multi-period games in which players are
constrained to choose strategies that are non-decreasing over time (i.e., players must increase their
respective contributions over time) (Gale, 1995, 2001; Lockwood & Thomas, 2002; Choi, Gale & Kariv,
2008). In contrast to these studies, our game employs a different feature – we require the stake level, rather
than the contribution, to be non-decreasing.
Watson (1999, 2002) examines theoretically how “starting small and increasing interactions over time”
is an equilibrium for dynamic cooperation with the option to break up unilaterally, which endogenously
forces “starting small” in equilibrium. In contrast, through determining the stake path exogenously, we
address whether gradualism promotes coordination at high-stake levels among fixed partners with no
chance of breaking up (each player in a group can choose not to contribute in each period, but not to leave
the group before the game ends), rather than whether players themselves choose to adopt a gradualist
approach. In addition, our setup focuses on weakest-link coordination problems with no chance of free
riding.
In summary, there are many organizational settings in which changing group sizes, group compositions,
or other factors is difficult, but where a leader can start a group with an easier version of a task to provide
reassurance and strengthen beliefs. This is a common practice and therefore worth investigating. We
explore this mechanism experimentally together with a theoretical framework, and demonstrate that it can
be a valuable tool for aiding high-stakes coordination.
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3.

Experimental Settings

3.1 Game Composition, Information Structure, and Payoff Structure
In July 2010, we conducted the laboratory experiment at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, China,
with 256 subjects that were recruited through the bulletin board system and posters. The majority of the
subjects were students from Renmin University and nearby universities.
The experiment consisted of 18 sessions, which were all computerized using the z-Tree software
package (Fischbacher, 2007). Both the instructions (see S1 in the Supplemental Material) and the game
information shown on the computer screen were in Chinese. In each session, we randomly assigned subjects
to groups of four; our sample consisted of 64 groups in total.
The experiment included two stages: the first stage comprised twelve periods, whereas the second one
comprised eight periods. Group members did not change within each stage, but subjects were randomly
reshuffled into groups of four after the first stage; this rule was announced publicly in each session. The
subjects were not told the exact number of periods in each stage. Instead, the subjects were told that the
experiment would last from 30 minutes to one hour. This includes the time for sign-up, reading of
instructions, completion of a quiz (designed to ensure that subjects understood the experimental rule), and
final payment. Furthermore, at the beginning of each period, subjects knew the stake of the current period
but not those of future periods. This condition replicates the circumstances of many real-world cases, in
which people do not know the exact number of coordination opportunities or what is at stake in future
interactions.
In each period, we endowed each subject with 20 points and asked each to give a certain number of
points to the common pool of his/her assigned group. The required number of points could vary across
periods, and subjects could only choose “to give the exact points required” (we use the natural term “give”
rather than “contribute” in the instruction) which we refer to as stake, or “not to give” at all. If all members
in a group contributed, then each member not only received the stake back, but also gained an extra return
equal to the stake. If not all group members contributed, then each member finished the period with only
his/her remaining points (i.e., the initial endowment in each period minus the contribution of the subject).
In summary, players earned points according to the following payoff function in each period, which is
conditional on the actions of all players in the same group:

 20  St , if Ai , t  C and A j , t  C , j  i

 i ,t ( Ai , t , A i , t )   20,
if Ai , t  NC
 20  S , if A  C and j  i, s.t . A  NC
t
i, t
j, t
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where  i ,t is i ’s payoff at period t , St is the stake at t . Ai , t and A j , t are the actions of i and j at t ,
respectively ( i and j are in the same group), and Ai , t denotes the list of actions of all players except i .

C represents “contribute,” whereas NC represents “not contribute.” Thus, each period features a four‐
player stag hunt game, in which there exists one mixed‐strategy Nash equilibrium, where each player
contributes with probability 2



1
3

, and two pure‐strategy Nash equilibria: where all players contribute and

where no player contributes. For all values of St , the secure equilibrium (all players choosing NC ) is
risk-dominant according to the Harsanyi-Selten definition. Except for the binary choice set in each period,
our setup is consistent with the minimum effort coordination literature that has a 2:1 benefit–cost ratio at
each pure-strategy equilibrium.
We did not allow communication across subjects. The preclusion of communication makes
coordination among players difficult. The reason is that we are interested in studying how gradualism may
help solve coordination difficulties in the absence of communication mechanisms.
At the end of each period, subjects knew whether all four group members (including himself/herself)
contributed the stake for that period, but did not know the total number of group members who contributed
(in case fewer than four members contributed). This design is consistent with the type of minimum-effort
coordination games with limited information feedback, in which the only commonly available historical
information to players is the minimum contribution of group members. This feature is popular in the
contract theory literature, in which an imperfect observation of efforts is commonly assumed. By adopting
this design, we can also increase the difficulty of coordination given other aspects of the experiment, and
study whether gradualism can help overcome such a difficulty.
The final total payment to each player equaled the accumulated earnings over all periods plus a showup fee. The exchange rate was 40 points per CNY 1. An average subject earned CNY 21–22 (around USD
3) including the show-up fee for the whole experiment, which covered ordinary meals for one to two days
on campus. With regard to its purchasing power, the payment was comparable to those experiments
conducted in other countries.

3.2 Treatment Group Assignments
Our experiment consisted of three main treatments: (1) Big Bang, (2) Semi-Gradualism, and (3) Gradualism.
To isolate the wealth effect on the contribution of participants from the effect of the three main treatments
in the second half (Periods 7–12) of the first stage, we also introduced a fourth High Show-up Fee treatment,
which is identical to the Big Bang treatment except that we give subjects higher show-up fees. All groups
in the three main treatments faced the same stake in the second half of the first stage, but stake paths differed
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for each treatment in the first half (Periods 1–6). We randomly assigned 12 subjects (three groups) into the
three main treatments for eight of the 18 sessions. In the remaining 10 sessions, we randomly assigned 16
subjects (four groups) into the four treatments (three main treatments and the High Show-up Fee treatment).
In total, we had 18, 18, 18, and 10 groups (or 72, 72, 72 and 40 subjects) in Big Bang, Semi-Gradualism,
Gradualism, and High Show-up Fee treatments, respectively. Table S2 in the Supplementary Material
shows that the randomization of treatment assignments worked well.
Figure 1 shows the game stakes across periods. For the Big Bang treatment, the stakes were always
kept at the highest level, which was 14.5 For the Semi-Gradualism treatment, we set the stakes at two for
the first six periods and then we set them at the highest stake for the next six periods. Finally, for the
Gradualism treatment, we gradually increased the stakes from 2 to 12 with a step of 2 for the first six periods,
and we kept them fixed at the highest stake for the next six periods.
This experiment had a second stage, as mentioned earlier. The subjects from various treatments were
randomly reshuffled into groups of four when they entered the second stage of the game. New group
members did not necessarily come from the same group in the first stage; this rule was made common
information. Within the second stage of the game, group compositions were fixed, and stakes were all set
at the highest stake (14) for all periods and all groups.
At the start of the second stage, we notified each player that he/she would enter a new random group.
At the end of each stage, we notified each player of the number of points he/she had accumulated to date.
At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to complete a brief survey that collected information
on age, gender, nationality, education level, concentration at school, working status, income, as well as their
risk preferences over lotteries adopted from Holt and Laury (2002).6
Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate the main experimental design.
[Table 1 about here]

4.

Theoretical Predictions and Hypotheses

4.1 A Simple Belief-based Learning Model
The coordination problem in each period involves multiple equilibria. When multiple equilibria exist, the
beliefs of the players are central in deciding which equilibrium outcome will be selected. Gradualism and
5

We calibrated the highest stake level using 12 and 14, and finally opted for 12 in two sessions and 14 in 16 sessions.
To make full use of the samples, we pooled all 18 sessions together in the analysis.
6
We code the risk aversion attitude as the number of option A chosen in questionnaire by Holt and Laury (2002),
ranging from 0 to 10. Thus, the larger the value, the more averse the subject is to risk. A simple regression of
contribution decision on risk aversion shows the average marginal effect of risk aversion on contribution decision is 0.01, which suggests that if risk aversion increases from 0 (smallest possible value) to 10 (largest possible value), on
average the contribution rate will fall by 10 percentage points. However, this effect is statistically insignificant when
standard errors are clustered at either the group level (p=0.44) or at the subject level (p=0.45).
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alternative stake paths may matter in the coordination dynamics because they affect the beliefs of players:
the stake level at the start of the game influences how players form their initial beliefs about the actions of
others, whereas the stake path influences how players subsequently update these beliefs. Thus, we develop
a simple belief-based learning model for theoretical predictions, although we do not rule out the possibility
that other theoretical models may also be consistent with our experimental results (Levine & Zheng, 2015).
The purpose of the model is to illustrate the intuition behind the efficacy of gradualism and its relation to
beliefs, rather than providing a comprehensive model of belief-based choices in dynamic coordination
games.
Intuition
Before we introduce the model and describe how the belief system works, we present the basic
intuition as follows. In the belief-based learning framework, rational players have prior beliefs about the
actions of others before the game starts, and update these beliefs based on the outcome of each period. The
lower the stake level at the start of a game, the stronger are players’ beliefs that others will contribute to the
group project, and as a result, they are themselves more likely to contribute. Therefore, under the weakestlink payoff structure, the lower initial stakes will produce higher rates of contribution and success in group
coordination (we define coordination success as the case that all group members contribute.) When groups
successfully coordinate at a given stake level, players reinforce their beliefs about the likelihood that others
will contribute at a stake level less than or equal to the current. Alternatively, coordination failure at a given
stake level causes players to doubt that others will subsequently contribute at a stake level greater than or
equal to the current level. Finally, when stakes increase in two consecutive periods, previous successful
coordination at the lower stake level may (or may not) largely influence the posterior beliefs of the players
regarding the actions of others at slightly (or substantially) higher stake levels. Thus, successful
coordination at a low-stake level may not imply an immediate successful coordination at a high-stake level
if the stake level increases dramatically. For this reason, slowly increasing the stake may better maintain
coordination success.
The main aspects of the model are belief-based learning, myopia, and standard self-interested
preference. 7 These assumptions allow us to focus on the belief updating process, which is an important
feature in dynamic coordination games. A more general model of dynamic games is beyond the scope of
the present study.
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We adopt the myopia (i.e., backward looking) assumption for three reasons. First, this assumption is often used in
learning models, such as reinforcement learning (e.g., Roth & Erev, 1995), belief-based learning (e.g., Fudenberg &
Levine, 1998), experience-weighted attraction learning (e.g, Camerer & Ho, 1998, 1999), and adaptive dynamics (e.g,
Crawford, 1995; Weber, 2006). Second, myopia allows us to focus on the key process of belief updating. Third, in
our experiment, players do not know the future stake and the number of periods, which may limit the potential of
forward looking and more strategic play. Thus, the backward-looking assumption is a reasonable simplification.
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Setup
The game structure and payoff rule in each period are as follows. There are N periods. In each period,
a group of I risk-neutral players conduct a binary coordination task: each player can choose to contribute
(C) or not to contribute (NC). The endowment per person in each period is E. The stake of the coordination
task, St (0  St  E ) , may vary across periods. Thus, each player can choose to contribute either zero or
exactly St in each period, but no other amount of efforts to the group project. We adopt a minimum-effort
(weakest-link, or more specifically, stag-hunt) payoff structure: the value of the project output for everyone
is  St (   1 ; we adopt   2 in our experiment) if all I players contribute St , and zero otherwise.
Players do not know the actions of others when they make their decisions. After each period, each
player knows whether all members in his/her group (including himself/herself) have contributed in that
period.
Beliefs
In contrast to the one-shot stage game, we consider a multi-period interaction between players where
they can update their subjective beliefs regarding the behavior of others over time through observing the
outcomes of the stage game in previous periods. In a typical player i’s mind, player j’s strategy type ( j  i )
is characterized by the highest level of contribution player j (unconditionally) chooses. This belief structure
on others’ strategy type is a fundamental assumption of our belief-based learning model.
Assumption 1 (Belief on Strategy Type). In players’ belief system, a player of strategy type X will
contribute x for all x  X .8
When a player decides whether or not to contribute, what essentially matters is his/her belief about all
other players’ strategy types being no less than the stake level in the current period: when other players’
strategy types are all greater than or equal to the stake level, they will surely contribute; when at least some
player’s strategy type is less than the stake level, such a player will not contribute.
Thus, in a period t, a player i’s belief on a contribution threshold X can be characterized by his/her
probability assessment that all other players’ strategy type will be at least X , denoted by Gti ( X ) , where
Gti () is a weakly decreasing function with Gti (0)=1 and lim Gti ( X )=0 .9
X 

8

Crawford (1995) and Weber (2005, 2006) adopt a similar modeling methodology in coordination games assuming
that players’ discrete action is determined by rounding the continuous latent strategy variable that represents their
beliefs. In our binary setting with varying stakes across periods, the strategy type X is such a latent strategy variable,
where player i with strategy type X is believed to contribute the stake St in period t if and only if St  X .
9
In the earlier version of this paper, a level-k thinking model (Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1995; Ho et al., 1998;
Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes & Crawford, 2006; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009) is assumed in order to derive
the theoretical predictions of the model. We thank the editors and the referees for suggesting the direction for a simpler
belief-updating learning process.
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Relying on different combinations of game outcomes and the decision of i, including case 1 where
everyone contributes, case 2 where i contributes while someone else does not, and case 3 where i does not
contribute, his/her belief Gti () will have various updating paths. The details are relegated to the “Belief
Updating” subsection in S3 of the Supplementary Material for interested readers.
Mechanisms
We consider three mechanisms that vary only in terms of the stake levels St (t  1, , N ) over periods.
Under the Big-Bang mechanism, the coordination game starts at a high-stake level S and continues with
the same stake level over time. Under the Semi-Gradualism mechanism, the coordination game starts at
a low-stake level S but jumps to the high-stake level S after N1 periods, where N1  N . Under the
Gradualism mechanism, the coordination game starts at the low-stake level S and gradually increases
the stake level over time at a constant rate such that after N1 periods the stake level reaches S and stays at
S afterwards.

Results
We now present the theoretical predictions of our belief-based model, relegating all the technical
analyses and proofs to the “Main Results and Proofs” subsection of S3 in the Supplementary Material.
Assuming that every player forms a belief regarding the minimum threshold that all other players will
contribute, where the threshold refers to the strategy type described in Assumption 1, a player’s optimal
behavior critically depends on his/her beliefs and can be characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Behavior). For a given period t with stake level St , player i chooses C if and only if
he/she believes the probability of all other players’ strategy type being at least St is no less than 

1

(namely, Gti ( St )   1 ) . Thus, in the symmetric belief case where every player has the same belief
( Gti ( St )=Gt ( St ) ), the equilibrium outcome is that every player contributes if Gt ( St )   1 and no player
contributes if Gt ( St )   1 .
The intuition of Lemma 1 is very simple: the more confident a player is about his/her group members
contributing at the current stake level, the more likely this player is going to contribute, and the more likely
the coordination will succeed.
We now investigate how different conditions on stake levels across periods will affect the likelihood
of successful coordination. First, we show that coordination is easier when the stake size is small.
Proposition 1 (Initial Stake). The lower the stake at period 1, S1 , the higher the probabilities that each
player will contribute and that the coordination will succeed at period 1.
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To see why the above proposition holds, note that the weak monotonicity property of the belief
function Gti () implies that a player is more confident about his/her group member contributing at a lower
stake level than at a high stake level. This observation together with the insight from Lemma 1 provides the
intuition behind Proposition 1.
Next we show that when fixing the size of stakes across different periods, the dynamic pattern of
coordination is path-dependent and persistent.
Proposition 2 (Persistency of Success/Failure). In two consecutive periods with the same stake St 1  St ,
a group will succeed in coordination at period t+1 when it succeeds at period t, and will fail in coordination
at period t+1 when it fails at period t.
We can also show that a slow increase in stake is always not worse than a quick increase for
maintaining successful coordination, as indicated in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 (Quick vs. Slow Increase). Conditional on successful coordination at period t, for given St
(Case a) or given St 1 (Case b), the smaller the stake difference between period t and t+1, St 1  St ( 0) ,
the higher the probability that the coordination at period t+1 will succeed.
Based on the results described above, we would like to theoretically compare the coordination success
rate of the three mechanisms in question (namely the Big-Bang mechanism, Semi-Gradualism mechanism,
and the Gradualism mechanism).
Proposition 4 (Performance Comparison). For any number of players ( I  2 ), for any multiplier (   1 ),
and for any weakly decreasing belief functions ( G1i (), i  1, , I ):
(a) Gradualism outperforms Semi-Gradualism; (b) Semi-Gradualism outperforms Big-Bang,
where mechanism A outperforms mechanism B if for period t  N1  1,, N , with stake level S , A
succeeds in coordination whenever B succeeds in coordination.
Proposition 4 provides a complete ranking of the coordination success rates among the three
mechanisms of interest, and shows that the Gradualism mechanism is superior to the other two in terms of
promoting successful coordination at the final high-stake periods.10

4.2 Main Hypotheses in Both Stages
Based on the theoretical predictions of Proposition 4, we would like to directly test how these mechanisms
perform in the laboratory environment, which is formally stated in the following hypothesis.
10

We also conducted comparative statics analysis for the impacts of the number of players, the multiplier size, and
the type of belief functions on the coordination success rate. We were also able to show that given strictly increasing
belief functions, there always exists a gradualism mechanism where the stake (not necessarily evenly) increases
overtime such that the success of coordination is achieved with certainty. All these results are included in the
“Additional Results and Proofs” subsection of S3 in the Supplementary Material.

13

Hypothesis 1: In Stage 1, the Gradualism treatment outperforms the Semi-Gradualism
treatment and the Semi-Gradualism treatment outperforms the Big Bang treatments in the highstake projects.
When subjects enter the second stage, they may have learned about group members via coordination
outcomes in the first stage and formed their beliefs about the general population regarding their contribution
tendencies. The coordination performance in the first stage of the game can influence subjects’ perception
of new group members and subsequently how they play in the second stage.11 Given that the Gradualism
treatment may promote more successful group coordination (relative to other treatments) in the first stage,
we propose that, conditional on being placed in the Gradualism treatment during the first stage, players will
be more likely to contribute (relative to players from other treatments) when they enter the second stage of
the game. Alternatively, players may not necessarily form their beliefs about new group members based on
their coordination history with old members, however, reinforcement learning (e.g., Roth & Erev, 1995)
can induce players with a coordination success (or failure) at the end of Stage 1 to (or not to) contribute
when they enter the first period of Stage 2. Thus, we have the second hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 2: Subjects who were in the Gradualism treatment in Stage 1 are more likely to
contribute in the first period of Stage 2 than those subjects in other treatments in Stage 1.

5. Results: Impact of Gradualism on Coordination
This section presents our results of coordination outcomes. We begin by focusing our analysis on the
following three outcome variables per period: (1) whether a group coordinates successfully (defined as
whether all four group members contribute) or not, (2) whether an individual contributes or not, and (3) the
payoff of each individual.

5.1 First Stage Result Highlights
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine the performance of various treatments in Periods 7–12 of the first stage,
when all treatments face the same high stake, which is the main interest of this study.
Main Result: The Gradualism treatment significantly outperforms alternative treatments:
starting at a low stake and growing slowly leads to more successful coordination and higher earnings
in the high-stake periods.
Figure 2 shows the success rate by treatment. In Period 7, 66.7% of Gradualism groups coordinate
successfully (i.e., all four group members contribute), whereas the success rates of Big Bang, Semi11

Other studies provide evidence that history can influence subsequent behavior. In a two-stage trust game, Bohnet
and Huck (2004) find that once players get to experience a cooperative environment in the first stage of a game, they
become more trusting (of others) in a new environment in the second stage.
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Gradualism, and High Show-up Fee groups are only 16.7%, 33.3%, and 30%, respectively. Figure 2
illustrates that the success rates for all the treatments remain stable from Period 7 to Period 12. We use the
average success rate over Periods 7–12 for each group as one observation, so each group has one
observation. The average success rate over Periods 7–12 in the Gradualism treatment is higher than that in
the Big Bang, Semi-Gradualism, and High Show-up Fee treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided
test: p<0.01, p=0.06, and p=0.09, respectively; observations are at the group level given that coordination
success is a group-level outcome; N=64). Success rate in the Big Bang treatment is insignificantly different
from that in the Semi-Gradualism and High Show-up Fee treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided
test: p=0.18, p=0.42, respectively). 12
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 3 shows the average individual earnings by treatment. Subjects in the Big Bang and High Showup Fee groups have higher earning potential (i.e., higher stakes) in Periods 1–6. However, on average, they
earn less than the subjects in the Gradualism treatment because of the high success rates in the Gradualism
treatment. The Semi-Gradualism groups earn less than the Gradualism treatment in Periods 2–6 because of
the lower earnings potential. These earning differences persist over Periods 7–12, when all the treatment
groups experience the same highest stake. The differences in accumulative individual earnings over Periods
7–12 between Gradualism and Big Bang, Semi-Gradualism and High Show-up Fee treatments are all highly
statistically significant (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test for Period 7: p<0.0001, p<0.0001, and
p=0.02, respectively, when observations are at the individual level, N=256; p-values become 0.05, 0.04 and
0.38, respectively, when observations are at the group level, N=64).13 Clearly, from the perspective of social
welfare, gradualism also works best.
[Figure 3 about here]
There may be a concern that the differences in performance over Periods 7–12 are caused by the effect
of individual wealth (earnings) accumulation over Periods 1–6.14 Section S4 in the Supplementary Material
addresses this concern in detail: by both comparing the performance between the High Show-up Fee

12

It is noted that there is no statistically significant difference in the successful coordination rate between the SemiGradualism treatment and the two Big-Bang treatments, while Proposition 4 implies the former outperforms the latter.
It is admitted that our theoretical comparison result is mainly qualitative instead of quantitative, and the size of
difference in performance between these two treatments crucially depends players’ belief functions at the initial stake.
Since the initial stake in our experiment is quite small, it is reasonable to expect G1i ( S1 ) to be close to 1, which leads
to a small difference in performance between these two treatments. Please see the comment at the end of the proof of
Proposition 4 in the S3 section in the Supplementary Materials for technical details.
13
Earnings in the Big Bang treatment are insignificantly different from those in the Semi-Gradualism and High Showup Fee treatments (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test: p=0.72 and p=0.37, respectively).
14
Such accumulated earnings may capture the impact of coordination history and play an important role in the
coordination dynamics, thus its elimination may be unnecessary. However, if accumulated earnings have a direct
effect beyond the history channel, then we should treat it cautiously.
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treatment and the other treatments and running regressions controlling for accumulated earnings, we show
that the aforementioned Main Result is not driven by the wealth effect.
Since the wealth effect does not drive our main result, we can combine the Big Bang and High Showup Fee treatments and compare them together with the Gradualism treatment, leading to even higher
statistical power (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test regarding average success rate over Periods 7–
12: p<0.0001 for individual-level, p<0.01 for group-level; Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test
regarding accumulated individual earnings over Periods 7–12: p<0.0001 for individual-level, p=0.07 for
group-level).
5.2 Coordination Dynamics in the First Stage
To identify why the Gradualism treatment performs best in Periods 7–12 relative to other treatments, we
examine the coordination dynamics in Figures 2 and 4 (and Figures S1-1 to S1-6 as well as Figure S2 in
the Supplementary Material). The three observations presented below support Propositions 1–3 in the
theoretical model, respectively.
Observation 1: The lower the stake size, the higher the average contribution and success rates
in Period 1.
Figure 4 displays contribution rates for Period 1. The average contribution rate is above 90% for SemiGradualism and Gradualism treatments with a low stake, which is much higher than the contribution rate
of 60% for Big Bang and High Show-up Fee treatments with a high stake (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney twosided test between these two categories: p<0.0001; observations are at the individual level).
[Figure 4 about here]
As shown in Figure 2, the differences in success rates are more evident. Over two-thirds of SemiGradualism and Gradualism groups coordinate successfully at the low initial stake, whereas only 16.6% (or
30%) of the Big Bang (or High Show-up Fee) groups succeed at the high initial stake (Wilcoxon-MannWhitney two-sided test between these two categories: p<0.0001; observations are at the group level). A
weakest-link structure requires that all four group members contribute at the same time to make
coordination a success, thus a difference in contribution rate may result in an even larger difference in
success rate.15
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Assuming the probability of contributing is independent across members in a group (which is plausible in Period 1
because players are randomly assigned to groups and have not yet interacted with each other), the success rate should
be the biquadrate of the contribution rate. As long as the contribution rates are sufficiently high, the difference in the
success rate exceeds that in the contribution rate.
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Observation 2: Conditional on having failed coordination in Period t, most groups fail at the
same or a higher stake in Period t+1; conditional on successfully coordinating in Period t, most groups
succeed at the same stake in Period t+1.
Figures S1-1 and S1-2 in the Supplementary Material present the coordination success rate in each
period conditional on coordination failure and success in the previous period, respectively. The success rate
is always smaller than 20% (and often equal to 0%) if a group fails in the previous period. Thus, once a
group fails to coordinate, it rarely becomes successful thereafter. This pattern is likely due to players
obtaining limited information feedback regarding the group outcome in each period: each member does not
know how many group members contribute if the group fails in coordination. The above findings are
consistent with the coordination literature, which largely concludes that a group which reaches an inefficient
outcome is not likely to subsequently achieve efficiency with limited information feedback and without
further mechanisms.
Similarly, once a group succeeds, it almost always remains successful at the same stake. The success
rate is generally larger than 80% (and often equal to 100%) if a group succeeds in the previous period
(except Period 7 for the Semi-Gradualism, when the stake jumps from 2 to 14). Figure S2 in the
Supplementary Material provides further details of the coordination results for each group.
Observation 3: Conditional on successfully coordinating in Period t, most groups succeed at a
slightly higher stake in Period t+1. However, fewer groups remain successful at a much higher stake
in Period t+1.
We note a large gap in success rates between the Gradualism and the Semi-Gradualism treatments in
Period 7, when the stake jumps from 2 to 14 for the latter treatment. Both treatments exhibit high success
rates of approximately 70% for the first six periods. However, the success rate of the Semi-Gradualism
treatment falls dramatically to only 33.3% in Period 7, whereas that of the Gradualism treatment remains
at a higher level of 66.7% (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney two-sided test between these two treatments in Period
7: p<0.05; observations are at the group level).
Figure S1-2 in the Supplementary Material shows that conditional on coordination success in the
previous period, the coordination success rate is always above 90% for Gradualism, whereas it is below 50%
for Semi-Gradualism in Period 7 when the stake jumps. Table S4 in the Supplementary Material reports the
formal regression results and shows that the performance difference across treatments is largely due to
different coordination success rates in the previous period: contribution (success) rate is on average 71.4
(93.3) percentage points smaller if the group failed in coordination in the previous period, compared to the
case when the group succeeded.
The results of Semi-Gradualism and Gradualism treatments in Periods 6 and 7 confirm the importance
of increasing the stake slowly and avoiding shocks to the stake size. In fact, in Period 7 the contribution
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rate of the Gradualism treatment is only about five percentage points higher than that of the SemiGradualism treatment (Figure 4). Why does the success rate of the Semi-Gradualism treatment drop sharply
from Period 6 to Period 7, whereas that of the Gradualism treatment remains high? Notably, a high
contribution rate does not guarantee a high success rate because the latter requires that most groups have
all four group members contributing at the same time. For the Semi-Gradualism treatment, a moderate 15
percentage points decrease in the contribution rate from Period 6 to Period 7 translates to a sharp 40
percentage points drop in the success rate, suggesting that a large portion of subjects who give up
contributing in Period 7 come from previously successful groups: an unanticipated big jump in the stake
causes some of the subjects in previously successful groups to be unwilling to continue contributing.
Previously successful coordination established at low-stake periods is sabotaged even if only one of the
four group members stops contributing. Figure S2 in the Supplementary Material further confirms this.
Thus, avoiding shocks can help overcome coordination difficulty and bolster coordination success, which
is exactly why the Gradualism treatment outperforms the Semi-Gradualism treatment.
Driven by Observations 2 and 3, the success rates are quite stable over all periods except for a drop
from Period 6 to Period 7 for the Semi-Gradualism treatment. Conditional on successfully coordinating in
Period 1, Big Bang, Gradualism, and High Show-up Fee groups usually remain successful in subsequent
periods. Groups in the Big Bang and High Show-up Fee treatments exhibit lower success rates in Period 1
than groups in the Gradualism treatment and therefore, on average, perform worse than groups in
Gradualism treatment at a high-stake level.

5.3 Second Stage Result Highlights
In this section, we examine whether the treatment type in the first stage influences individual behavior and
outcomes in the second stage, when subjects are placed in a new group.
Observation 4: Subjects exposed to the Gradualism treatment in Stage 1 are more likely to
contribute upon entering a new group in Stage 2 than subjects who are previously exposed to other
treatments. However, this difference quickly disappears.
Figure 4 shows that the subjects in the Gradualism treatment are 12.2 percentage points (86.1 vs. 73.9;
p<0.05) more likely to contribute in the first period of Stage 2. However, the higher contribution rate at the
beginning of Stage 2 of those Gradualism subjects translates into neither a higher success rate (Figure 2)
nor higher average earnings (Figure 3). On average, Gradualism subjects earn 1.5 points less than subjects
from other treatments (the difference is statistically insignificant.) As a direct consequence, the contribution
rate of Gradualism subjects decreases faster than that of other subjects from Period 1 to Period 2 of Stage
2 and becomes comparable to that of other subjects in Period 2 and throughout Stage 2 (Figure 4). This
convergence of behavior suggests a belief updating process that, after observing the coordination outcome
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in Period 1 of Stage 2, the subjects from the Gradualism treatment update their beliefs, perceiving their new
group partners less likely to contribute than their first stage partners; therefore, they become less willing to
contribute in subsequent periods.
Section S6 in the Supplementary Material provides more results regarding the second stage.

6. Belief Elicitation Experiment: Evidence of Belief-based Learning
In order to further explore whether the belief-based learning model outlined in Section 4 does indeed
provide the underlying reason why gradualism works, we conducted a supplementary experiment at Xiamen
University in May 2013, in which we adopted an identical design as the main experiment except that we
elicited the belief of subjects about the action of others in each period.16
We have 24 subjects in the elicitation experiment (two groups each for Big Bang, Semi-Gradualism,
and Gradualism treatments). These subjects are different from those in the main experiment. After each
period, we ask the belief of each subject about the number of contributors among the other three group
members, NC, in his/her group (note that the group size is four). Section S7 in the Supplementary Material
reports the detailed belief elicitation process.
We check whether the decisions of the subjects are consistent with their beliefs in each period. Then,
we examine whether they have updated their beliefs based on the outcome feedback after each period. We
present the results in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Considering that estimating the treatment effect is not
the purpose of the supplementary experiment, we pool all subjects and all periods in two stages and gain a
total of 480 subject-period observations.
Table 2 shows how belief affects the contribution decision of the subjects in that period. We report
OLS results for easier interpretation. As a robustness check, we also conduct Firth logit regressions (Heinze
& Schemper, 2002) because the contribution variable is binary and the logit regressions encounter the
problem of separation (Heinze & Schemper, 2002), which leads to qualitatively similar results (see Table
S6 in the Supplementary Material). All five specifications with different control variables consistently show
that the contribution decisions of the subjects in each period are indeed largely affected by their beliefs that
all the other three group members contribute in that period.
Table 3 shows the belief formation and updating process. Column 1 examines the initial belief that all
the other three group members contribute in Period 1. A higher stake in Period 1 leads to a smaller belief
that all other three group members contribute, although the coefficient is statistically insignificant (note that
we only have 24 observations). Columns 2 through 5 examine the belief updating process with different
16

We ended up not eliciting beliefs in the main experiment because we were concerned that belief elicitation would
have contaminated our results. Such a concern is verified by Rutström and Wilcox (2009) and Gächter and Renner
(2010).
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control variables. All results show that beliefs indeed are updated based on the previous belief and the
coordination outcome.
To conclude, the results provide suggestive evidence for the belief-based learning model. Of course,
the purpose of our model was to illustrate how gradualism might work, but not to present a model of the
actual belief-formation process taking place in the experiment. In addition, our evidence is only suggestive
because we cannot rule out the possibilities that the actual decision is independent of beliefs, and that the
beliefs are ex-post rationalizations when they are elicited.

7.

Discussion and Concluding Remarks

In this study, we investigate the effects of gradualism – defined as increasing, step-by-step, the stake level
required for group coordination projects – on successful group coordination using data from a randomized
laboratory experiment. No previous study has identified which pattern of successive and exogenously set
stake levels produces successful group coordination. We find strong evidence that gradualism can serve as
a powerful mechanism in achieving socially optimal outcomes in group coordination. Gradualism
significantly outperforms alternative paths, which shows that starting at a low-stake level and slowly
growing the stake size are both important for coordination at later periods and at a substantial high-stake
level.
We propose a belief-based learning model as one underlying channel that explains why gradualism
leads to successful group coordination at a substantial high-stake level. The results from a supplementary
experiment with belief elicitation support this explanation. With that said, although the model provides a
useful framework for rationalizing the patterns in the data, we cannot definitively rule out alternative
channels that can also explain our main result.
The two key features of the gradualism mechanism in the current study are a) the binary choice set in
each period, and b) the gradual increase in the stake of projects. First, the subjects are restricted to two
choices in each period (without mandatory or semi-mandatory institutions, such as sanctions and social
pressures): to contribute the exact stake size or not to contribute at all. The binary choice set prevents players
from contributing too little to harm others and from contributing too much to get hurt, thus serving as an
effective coordination device. Second, a small initial stake leads to a high belief that others will contribute
and thus encourages players to contribute at the beginning, whereas a gradual path of increasing stake
maintains such an optimistic belief as well as the high willingness of the players to contribute even when
the stake becomes substantial.
Our second finding relates to the spillover effect of coordination experience across social groups.
Subjects treated in the gradualism setting are more likely to contribute upon entering a new group than
subjects under different treatments. However, when these gradualism subjects find that their contributions
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have not been rewarded in the new groups, they reduce their tendency to contribute. Thus, the contribution
behavior of the subjects treated in the gradualism regime and alternative regimes converges quickly. This
result may have policy implications for ensuring efficient coordination outcomes when society members
from diverse cultures and institutions merge.
Our findings have broad implications for how managers can structure team assignments optimally
before the team performs crucial high-stake tasks. Specifically, our central finding regarding gradualism
underscores the role that supervisors and managers can play in leading teams to successfully coordinate in
high-stake tasks and achieve higher productivity: teams should start in a low-stake situation and then slowly
move to tasks involving higher stakes. Our study demonstrates that gradualism can be a valuable tool for
aiding high-stake coordination: a leader can start a group with an easier version of a task to provide
reassurance and strengthen beliefs.
Various management practices, from finance to law enforcement to venture capital, already exhibit
this stylized gradualist feature of group coordination. In industries that significantly rely on effective
coordination – such as consulting, information technology, engineering, or medical care (Gittell, 2002;
Faraj & Xiao, 2006) – our findings point to a promising approach that teams can use so as to gradually
work up to larger projects with bigger efforts and investments. In real world teams, gradualism may be even
more effective because it would also enable managers to swap out low-performing employees or disband
dysfunctional teams if they fail to perform in low-stake situations before the stakes become too high.
Therefore, managers can employ the gradualism feature as a risk-mitigation strategy. Although there are
other methods that managers can use to increase productivity in the organizations they oversee, our study
provides one feasible and effective method that enhances the design of group training, improves overall
team effort and increases subsequent team productivity.
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Figure 1: Stake Patterns of the Treatments
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Note: The first and second vertical dotted lines separate the two halves (Periods 1–6 and 7–12) of the first
stage, and the two stages (Periods 1–12 and 13–20), respectively. Coordination performance of different
treatments in the second half (Periods 7-12) of the first stage is the main interest of this study. The High
Show-up Fee treatment is identical to the Big Bang treatment except for a higher show-up fee (see Table 1
for details). Group members are fixed within each stage, whereas subjects from various treatments are
reshuffled when they enter the second stage.
Figure 2: Success Rates of Groups by Treatment and Period

Note: A group coordinates successfully if all four members contribute the stake in that period.
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Figure 3: Average Individual Earning by Treatment and Period

Figure 4: Contribution Rate by Treatment and Period
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Table 1: Summary of Treatments in the First Stage
Treatment
Big Bang Semi-Gradualism
Endowment in each period (points)
20
20
Show up Fee (points)
400
400
Exchange Rate (points/CNY)
40
40
Stake in Period 1 (points)
14
2
Stake in Period 6 (points)
14
2
Stake in Period 7-12 (points)
14
14
Number of groups
18
18
Number of subjects
72
72
Average earning up to Period 6 (points; excluding show-up fee)
112.42
126.31
Median earning up to Period 6 (points; excluding show-up fee)

106

130

Gradualism
20
400
40
2
12
14
18
72
143.94

High Show-up Fee
20
480
40
14
14
14
10
40
127.35

162

106

Note: We have 18 sessions in total. Ten sessions have 16 subjects for each session who are randomized into the above four treatments, and the other
eight sessions have 12 subjects for each session who are randomized into the Big Bang, Semi-Gradualism, and Gradualism treatments.
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Table 2: The Effect of Belief on Contribution Decisions in Belief Elicitation Sessions (OLS)
Contribution Dummy
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Belief that all other three
0.916***
0.847***
0.841***
0.723***
0.518***
contribute
(0.050)
(0.069)
(0.067)
(0.082)
(0.106)
Stake
-0.012**
-0.011**
0.001
0.001
0.006
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.006)
Subject fixed effects
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Period fixed effects
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Lagged contribution dummy
0.213**
0.106
(0.096)
(0.080)
Lagged success dummy
0.318**
(0.116)
Constant
0.291***
0.0871
0.131*
-0.0704
-0.0755
(0.0729)
(0.0698)
(0.0758)
(0.0893)
(0.0817)
Observations
480
480
480
456
456
R-squared
0.669
0.731
0.762
0.786
0.801
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Contribution is a dummy indicating whether the subject contributes in the current period. Belief
ranges from 0 to 1 and represents the subject’s belief that all other three group members contribute in
current period. Stake refers to the stake in current period. Firth logit regressions (Heinze & Schemper,
2002) in Table S6 of the Supplementary Material report qualitatively similar results.
Table 3: Belief Formation and Updating in Belief Elicitation Sessions (OLS)
Belief that all other three group members contribute in current period
Period 1
Period 2-20 (Both Stages Together)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Lagged belief
0.372***
0.373***
0.260***
0.269***
(0.070)
(0.0683)
(0.061)
(0.057)
Lagged success dummy
0.490***
0.488***
0.566***
0.561***
(0.064)
(0.0623)
(0.066)
(0.062)
Stake
-0.011
(0.014)
0.002
0.001
0.000
△Stake
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.016)
Subject fixed effects
N
N
N
Y
Y
Period fixed effects
N
N
N
N
Y
Constant
0.693***
0.061***
0.060***
0.102***
0.143***
(0.094)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.008)
(0.042)
Observations
24
456
456
456
456
R-squared
0.032
0.777
0.777
0.808
0.818
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Belief ranges from 0 to 1. Stake refers to the stake in current period. △Stake is the
difference in stake between current period and the previous period.
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